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3 March 1947

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

Subject: Item 5, Daily Summary No. 312

Reference: Memorandum from Chief, ICAPS, "Daily Summary,"
28 February 1947

1. In the Reference the Chief, ICAPS, invites your attention to item 5, Daily Summary No. 312, 24 February 1947, as an item which, in his opinion, does not meet the standards required of an intelligence document designed primarily for the President, and requests your comment.

2. The item in question was presented by the Branch concerned (Western Europe) as a matter of such importance as possibly to warrant a Special Evaluation and as at least a "must" item for the Daily with C.I.G. comment.

3. The Intelligence Staff concurred in running the item in the Daily, considering, in addition to its intrinsic importance, the known interest of Admiral Leahy in similar items (e.g., item 3, Daily Summary No. 280, and Special Evaluation No. 10, both of which he had marked for discussion with the President).

4. The Intelligence Staff also considered that the information had originated with the new Director-designate of Central Intelligence. He apparently deemed it of sufficient importance to warrant its communication to State (through the Ambassador) rather than by Naval channels only. The Ambassador's concurrence is evident.

5. It is unnecessary to argue as to whether the selection of this item for the President's consideration was warranted. Admiral Leahy marked it as one of four items in Daily Summary No. 312 to discuss with the President, and by another mark has indicated that he did in fact discuss it with the President.

6. A reason for the criticism in the Reference may be that this item was not used in the State Department TOP SECRET Summary for the President for that day, indicating a judgment in that quarter that it was insufficiently important. If we are to be bound by the judgments of the Department of State and merely to echo its summaries, C.I.G. has no function. Our judgment is

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vindicated by the concurrence of Admiral Leahy, as indicated above.

7. If criticism is directed toward the comment on this item, rather than its selection, it should be borne in mind that in Special Evaluation No. 8 we had indicated that the French Army was the chief obstacle to a Communist coup d'etat.

8. This instance is a prime example of the folly of permitting such group as ICAPS to dictate as to the substantive content of our publications. In view of its functions and of its remoteness from the working level, ICAPS cannot be so well informed as to either the significance of intelligence information or our readers' indications of interest as are the Regional Branches and the Intelligence Staff.

9. I earnestly recommend that you communicate to ICAPS not only the substance of paragraphs 2 - 5 above, but also that of [redacted] mine of 26 February regarding our discussions [redacted] the latter as necessary for ICAPS' understanding of the function of the Daily Summary.

10. The Intelligence Staff sincerely welcomes constructive criticism, but feels that it and the Regional Branches should be protected from harrassment by such sniping as that in the Reference.

[redacted]
LUDWELL L. MONTAGUE
Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE

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Chief ICAPS.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, R & E

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*add * here*

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Whether selection of this item

It would seem to be decided by the fact that

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